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Consciousness

Our most basic state is more complicated than you think!
By Alyssa Dowling
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Rude Awakenings

I

n 1998, Carol Weiher awoke to
the sound of disco music—and, if
that wasn’t bad enough, the next
thing she heard was “cut deeper,
pull harder.” Carol was having
her right eye surgically removed
and the muscle relaxants she was
administered prevented her from
alerting anyone that she was still
conscious and in pain (1).
“I was doing a combination of praying and pleading
and cursing and screaming and
trying anything I could do but I
knew that nothing was working,”
said Weiher. Weiher is one of a
relatively small group of people
who have experienced anesthesia awareness, a phenomenon in
which anesthesia does not render
the patient properly unconscious.
In the worst scenarios, the patient
wakes to tremendous pain without
any means of communicating; they
must simply bear the physical and
psychological consequences of
this deeply traumatic experience.
Still, though one or two people
out of every thousand who go
under anesthesia experience some
degree of awareness during their
procedure, only an unlucky few
can feel pain (1).
Experiences like Carol’s
highlight our tenuous understanding of consciousness and the
dangers of not researching the
subject further. Through the study
of comas, anesthesia, and artificial
intelligence, scientists and philosophers alike have realized that our
ability to understand and scientifically define consciousness is crucial.
Even so, a precise scientific definition of consciousness is extremely
difficult to establish, in part because we use the word in so many
ways. We are conscious, but we can
lose consciousness while sleeping,
under anesthesia, or from a brain
injury. I can also say that I am conscious of something to indicate that

Patient undergoing eye surgery by Sasint on Pixabay.

I am aware of it, a definition that
has little to do with consciousness
in reference to the self.
Consciousness is a problem
so nebulous that it is often difficult
to know what questions to ask or if
science will even be able to provide greater insight. It is a subject
that some think is an illusion and
others consider the essential question of neuroscience. Some believe it is irreducible, while others
want to study it at the molecular
level. Still, to productively discuss
consciousness, we must have a
generally agreed-upon definition.
Though the scientifically accepted
definition of consciousness will
change over time, it is possible to
combine several popular definitions to make the concept more
accessible. Broadly, consciousness
refers to the ability to experience
one’s existence rather than simply recording and responding to
it as a computer program might.
Consciousness consists of inner,
qualitative, subjective states and
processes of sentience or awareness (2). Though a robot may
detect the world around it, it is
not consciousness because this
requires a qualitative feeling along
with those inputs in conjunction
with communication, thought,

and reflection (2). Consciousness
can be divided into two functional components: wakefulness and
awareness. While wakefulness refers to arousal, awareness refers to
how we process the content of our
consciousness. Put simply, wakefulness is required to perceive a
tree or experience happiness, but
demonstrating wakefulness does
not guarantee awareness—both
are necessary for consciousness
(3).

The History of
the Study of
Consciousness
In the seventeenth century,
after the Renaissance, the Greek
concept of a “theory” was combined with systematic observation
and experimentation (2). However,
at this same time, conflict between
science and the Church raged,
and scientists and philosophers
adjusted their teachings to protect themselves and their field of
study. To separate science away
from the church and thus protect
it, Descartes argued that reality
has a strict and abiding cleavage between the mental and the
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physical, a designation that was
long accepted. Given this reasoning, Descartes was able to create
a separation between religion and
science of sorts, with a degree of
success. At the time, this was a
decent compromise—the church
had uncontested domain over the
mind and soul, and scientists were
relatively free to study the material
world. Although this distinction
was useful at the time, it has persisted much longer than its utility.
Consequently, for reasons ranging
from ease to convention, science
has been considered a strictly
objective, third-person endeavor.
This leaves scientists little agency
to provide insight on first-person
subjective experiences—especially
not one as abstract as consciousness. After all, to study consciousness is to examine our very conception of the human soul (2).
This history meant that it
wasn’t until the 1990s that neuroscientists began to regard consciousness as a legitimate area
of study in the natural sciences.
The Merriam-Webster dictionary
defines neuroscience as “a branch
(such as neurophysiology) of the
life sciences that deals with the
anatomy, physiology, biochemistry, or molecular biology of nerves
and nervous tissue and especially
with their relation to behavior and
learning.” Simply put, it is the
study of the brain. It is thus puzzling that we do not study a fundamental function of the brain—
consciousness. Studying the brain
without studying how the brain
causes and sustains conscious
states is like studying the lungs
without studying how they allow
us to breathe. Though consciousness admittedly involves more
philosophical, spiritual, and ethical
considerations and is certainly
more complex than breathing, the
logic stands. Further, the study of
consciousness should be driven by
many of the same medical consid-
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erations that would drive the study
of any other major physiological
process. Even if neuroscience will
never be able to fully explain consciousness, and I suspect its study
will provide useful insights into
comas, anesthesia, and perhaps
our very personhood.

The Neuroanatomical Basis of
Consciousness
The study of the neuroanatomical basis of consciousness is still
in its nascent stages. There are
many different theories, but it is
important to understand some of
them and how they are derived to
understand the ways in which neuroscientists are making progress in
their study of consciousness. The
traditional viewpoint is that consciousness essentially arises from
interacting neurons in the midline
of the brain, the cerebral cortex
(associated with attention, awareness, etc.), and the reticular activation system (regulating alertness
and wakefulness) (4). At the same
time, contemporary research suggests that consciousness originates
in the frontal region of the brain,

while others maintain that it comes
from the hindbrain. In studying
the material basis of consciousness, researchers must address the
external sensory network and the
internal self-conscious network,
making consciousness a uniquely
complex function. There may be
many theories of consciousness
simply because so many parts of
the brain are involved.
One way that neuroscientists attempt to simplify the
physical study of consciousness is
through the study of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC).
Because these “signatures of
consciousness” are not necessarily
causal, they are much easier to
study and identify (if slightly less
illuminating). Stanislas Dehaene,
a neuroscientist at Collège de
France, has identified four “signatures of consciousness (5).” Of
those, the P3 wave in the dorsolateral cortex (behind the top of your
forehead) correlates most reliably
with normal conscious states (5).
Physicians have successfully used
measurements of these “signatures of consciousness” in coma
patients to predict which individuals are most likely to regain consciousness. Neuroscience jargon
aside, our understanding of neural
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was moderately correlated with
the duration of consciousness
loss following brain damage. The
study of the claustrum as a neural
correlate of consciousness demonstrates major issues with the study
of NCCs in general. For one, the
structure is thin and in close proximity to a variety of other brain
structures, making it challenging
to study using neuroimaging (3).
Additionally, though scientists like
Crick and Koch proposed that the
claustrum plays a crucial role in
consciousness due to its structure
and connectivity, more recent
research does not support this
same hypothesis. Instead, results
suggest that several neural networks combine to generate and
maintain consciousness, although
some, such as the claustrum, may
be more involved than others (3).

Forms of Consciousness. Original image by Alyssa Dowling. Created in Biorender.

correlates of consciousness is
proving to be an essential part of
developing more accurate prognoses for individuals in unconscious
states.

Curious Case of
the Claustrum—
A Promising NCC
The claustrum is a thin
sheet of neurons attached to the
bottom of the neocortex in the
middle of the brain (6). Relatively
little is known about the function of the claustrum, but we do
know it provides functional links
between the frontal cortices and
the association cortices in the
brain. These linkages suggest that
the claustrum plays a role in how
perceptual information interacts
with the arousal (alertness) system,
and thus is involved in the generation of consciousness. In 2014,

Koubeissi et al., in the pursuit of a
cure for epilepsy, implanted electrodes deep in a woman’s brain in
an attempt to record signals from
different brain regions during seizures (7). When an electrode next
to the claustrum was stimulated,
the woman lost consciousness.
When the stimulus stopped, she
immediately regained consciousness without recollection of the
incident. Other wider-scale studies have found that the degree
of claustrum damage affects the
duration of consciousness loss,
suggesting that the claustrum
plays a role in the restoration of
consciousness,but not maintenance (3). One study looked at
Vietnam veterans with traumatic
brain injuries that were limited to
one brain region, and impacted
the claustrum. Researchers defined
traumatic brain injuries as injuries
that caused at least 24 hours of
loss of consciousness. They found
that damage to the claustrum

Theories of
Consciousness
While research of the neurobiological basis of consciousness
expands this field of study, a more
holistic approach is to perhaps
examine the experience of consciousness. Instead of trying to
reduce consciousness into biological parts, theories of consciousness
attempt to give a more systemic
explanation. The first, the global
workspace theory of consciousness
(GW), was proposed in 1998 (14).
This idea is essentially that a single
brain region is incapable of generating consciousness. Instead, consciousness requires the coordination of many different parts of the
cerebrum—an idea that encourages researchers to explore the brain
as a whole (8). Interestingly, this
theory (along with some related
ones) posits that computers will
one day gain consciousness. Critics of this theory say that it fails to
explore what consciousness is and
instead only provides a vague call
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Global Workspace Theory of Consciousness (GW). Original image by Alyssa Dowling. Created in BioRender.

to consider the entire brain in the
production of consciousness.
The integrated information theory, on the other hand,
conjectures that consciousness is
simply “the capacity of a system to
integrate information,” and provides a mathematical framework
for evaluating the magnitude and
quality of consciousness (9). This
theory, while helpful for measuring
consciousness on a clinical level,
provides conditions that are necessary, but not sufficient on their own
to produce consciousness.
More metaphysical theories of consciousness exist, with
two being the most prominent.
Some think that consciousness is
a fundamental building block of
the universe in the way that physicists think of space and time and
mass (13). According to this theory,
there are fundamental laws that
govern these building blocks, but
they cannot be understood and
explained in more basic terms.
Others still think that consciousness could be universal and that
every system can possess some
degree of consciousness. This
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idea is called panpsychism and
suggests that everything, from a
human to a photon, has some element of subjective feeling, some
primordial precursor to consciousness as a human experience. This
idea does not assert that everything is intelligent or thinking, but
rather that everything has some
aspect of “universal” conception
of consciousness. While this idea
is somewhat incomprehensible in
Western, monotheistic culture, it is
seen as a more intuitive explanation in cultures that see the human
mind as continuous with the rest of
nature.
The idea that consciousness is both fundamental and
universal has been taken up by
a neuroscientist by the name of
Giulio Tononi, who has rigorously
developed the idea via mathematical theory (13, 9). This mathematical theory is centered around the
idea of phi, which is a measure of
the amount of information integrated in the system, and thought
to be related to consciousness.
Therefore, the human brain, with
its large degree of information

integration, has the highest degree
of consciousness. Everything else,
down to a microbe, has a non-zero
degree of consciousness. In the
science of consciousness, this is
one of the leading theories, and
it has the potential via ethical and
social implications to transform
how we relate to nature. On the
other hand, this theory could apply
to non-organic systems like computers, which, according to the
pan-psychic view, have the capacity to be completely conscious. This
is a view that many neuroscientists,
philosophers, and religious leaders
would take major issue with. On
the topic of computers especially,
leading neuroscientists have taken
the stance that consciousness has
much more to do with our nature
as living and breathing organisms
than with pure intelligence, and
thus would reject Tononi’s hypothesis (12). It perhaps follows that the
“pan-psychic” view would need to
only apply to living things, at least
for the time being, to properly
mesh with other neuroscientific
conceptions of consciousness.
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Philosophy of
Consciousness and
the Limits of
Consciousness
There is tension between
neurological and philosophical
theories and conceptions of consciousness. Although to be human
we must have a brain in relative
working order, some philosophers
believe that there is confusion between the necessary and sufficient
conditions for consciousness. Thus,
when thinking about neuroscience,
it is important to not lose sight of
that fundamental mind-brain problem. Most neuroscientists do not
think that the mind is the brain,
but some neuroscientists seem to
get lost in chemical and anatomical explanations of consciousness
and risk losing sight of the forest
in their study of the trees. There is
a legitimate fear that an overly reductionist approach to conscious-

ness will lead to purely chemical
explanations of behavior. For instance, there is a quoted instance
in which Patricia Churchland, a
so-called neuro-philosopher, came
home after a difficult day at work
as told her husband, “Paul, don’t
speak to me, my serotonin levels
have hit bottom, my brain is awash
in glucocorticoids, my blood
vessels are full of adrenaline, and
if it weren’t for my endogenous
opiates I’d have driven the car
into a tree on the way home. My
dopamine levels need lifting. Pour
me a Chardonnay, and I’ll be down
in a minute (10).” It is hard to say
how seriously these sorts of sentiments are taken, but at the very
least I think it is easy to understand
how such statements would alarm
those who take a more holistic
approach to human consciousness and behavior. Further, such
explanations do not yet provide a
particularly convincing explanation
for consciousness, and cannot be
taken entirely seriously.

Covert
Consciousness
Severe brain injuries often
lead to a loss of consciousness
for weeks or even longer. In such
unresponsive states, it is difficult
to determine to what degree the
patient is aware or conscious. Fifty
years ago, these patients probably would not have survived their
injury, but as life support technology has improved and such patients
can be sustained for longer periods, doctors and neuroscientists
have identified a newfound demand for more robust techniques
for determining the degree of
a patient’s consciousness. Many
patients who are unable to give
muscular or behavioral indications of consciousness have been
shown, through brain imaging,
to have some degree of covert
consciousness (11). These findings
have many clinical applications
and can be used to give more
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accurate treatments and diagnoses
to unconscious patients. This can
also contribute to more accurate
prognoses—that is, brain imaging that discovers some degree
of covert consciousness can help
provide more accurate predictions
as to whether or not a patient will
regain consciousness. Patients who
exhibit some degree of subjective
experience as discovered by brain
imaging are substantially more
likely to recover from their injuries.
When we discuss impairments of consciousness, it is
essential to distinguish between
the different states that are possible and the spectrum on which
they exist. Although there are
ideal types, each unconscious
state is different from the next,
and a person’s level of consciousness exists at different degrees of
several different axes. The coma is
the most referenced impairment
of consciousness and can basically be understood as a very deep
sleep that you cannot awake from.
In the “ideal type” of coma there
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is little to no movement, the eyes
are closed, and the patient has
little to no awareness or processing of their surroundings. The
opposite of a coma is understood
to be full consciousness in which
you have total awareness, normal
processing, and physical ability to
respond to the environment. Still,
there are types of consciousness
impairments that fall into other
categories, such as the vegetative
state, during which a person can
open their eyes and there is some
level of alertness, but they do
not exhibit full consciousness. An
individual in a vegetative state is
sort of a physical shell of a person
in that they lack consciousness,
but display some movement and
the theoretical ability to use their
body (if their brain could utilize
that ability) (11). Opposite from a
vegetative state is a person who is
“locked-in.” These patients are fully conscious but have limited to no
ability to express their consciousness, often due to an injury to the
pons, a part of the brain which

plays a large role in transmitting
and receiving motor information.
This is a condition in which it is
particularly vital to discover covert
consciousness since it is distinctly
inhumane to mistake a fully conscious (though immobile) person
for someone in a vegetative state.
Consider, for example, instances
in which fully conscious patients
overheard family members saying
that it would be better if they were
dead, or adult individuals who
were stuck in front of a TV playing Barney for several months (7).
Indeed, when locked-in patients
recover or find ways to communicate, they generally have suffered
trauma from having been treated
as an object during the time in
which their degree of consciousness was misunderstood. At the
very least, discussions of covert
consciousness should include the
vital importance of what physicians
have been taught for decades)—
medical professionals and family
alike must treat seemingly unconscious individuals as if they can
understand and respond to everything that is said and done around
them.
Considering that there is
no direct test for consciousness,
the study of covert consciousness is intimately connected to
the technologies which detect it
(11). While behavioral and muscular indications of consciousness
are undeniably central to our
understanding of the concept,
brain imaging has demonstrated
how limiting and unsatisfactory
such markers are. Functional MRI
scans have drastically changed
the quality of life for seemingly
unconscious patients and have
helped identify a need for further
therapeutic strategies. Still, these
scans always require transporting
the patients, which can be costly
and dangerous. The scan itself is
expensive and logistically difficult
since there must be physicians,

SCIENTIFIC KENYON

nurses, and respiratory technologists present to safely perform an
MRI on a patient who may be on
some degree of life support (11).
Additionally, consciousness generally fluctuates during recovery, and
so a patient that starts out unconscious may become increasingly
conscious without any behavioral
change. However, repeated MRI
scans may not be logistically or
financially possible. Luckily, many
new promising technologies are
being researched that could be
used more consistently. One major
study used EEGs and found that
around 15% of patients in an
“unconscious” state demonstrated
some degree of covert consciousness. Other studies have put the
number at closer to 30, or even 40
percent (11).

Conclusions
Pinning down a definition
of consciousness demonstrates
how nebulous the concept can
be. At the same time, however,
the clinical advantages of better
understanding consciousness are
evident. Providing more suitable
treatment plans and prognoses for
unconscious patients, preventing
anesthesia awareness, and finding
a more connected way of thinking
about our place in the world are all
reasons the study of consciousness
is essential. While there is certainly
some validity to complaints of the
inscrutable nature of consciousness, it is not an area of neuroscience that we can afford to ignore
because it is too complicated or
because of the possibility that we
might never understand it. All we
need to know is that the journey
toward a better understanding of
consciousness will improve clinical
outcomes, our understanding of
ourselves, and perhaps even our
understanding of our place in the
world.
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